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Panel Topic:  
Enabling Affordable Programs through 
Informed Early Decisions
What’s AoA got to do with it?
USD(AT&L). (2013, November 26). 
DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the 
Defense Acquisition System –
Interim Instruction, Figure 1 (p. 5) 
and Enclosure 9, “Analysis of 
Alternatives,” paragraph 1.
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
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“The AoA assesses potential materiel 
solutions that could satisfy validated 
capability requirement(s) documented in 
the Initial Capabilities Document, and 
supports a decision on the most cost 
effective solution to meeting the validated 
capability requirement(s).”
It’s part of early 
decisionmaking.
“In developing feasible alternatives, the 
AoA will identify a wide range of solutions 
that have a reasonable likelihood of 
providing the needed capability.”
It initializes the 
solution trade-
space.
AoA Scope is Key to Affordability
 As a matter of policy
 “Examination of key requirements cost-performance 
relationships, when merged with affordability analysis results 
during AoAs, provides the information needed to support 
sound material solution decisions about affordable products.” 
USD(AT&L). (2013, November 26). DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System –
Interim Instruction, Enclosure 8, “Affordability Analysis and Constraints,” paragraph 3.d.
 Empirically
 GAO study of 32 major DoD acquisition programs found 
strong correlation between AoAs that were “too narrowly 
scoped” and cost growth in the subsequent programs.
Government Accountability Office. (2009, September). Defense Acquisitions: Many [AoAs] Have 
Not Provided a Robust Assessment of Weapon System Options (GAO-09-665), pp. 7-12.
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AoA:  an element of early decisionmaking that contributes to 




 Most AoAs are poorly scoped (GAO, 2009:  13 of 22)*
 Little or no guidance on this topic is available  
 Research goal
 Identify guiding principles that can help improve AoA scoping
 Ensure those principles are rooted in sound analysis
 Approach
 Review documents (instructions, guidance, handbooks, etc.)
 Interview AoA consumers, overseers, practitioners, critics
 Apply systems analysis / systems thinking methods and tools
*These findings predate Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-23, 123 Stat. 
1704 (2009).  However, the effect of WSARA reforms on AoA scoping is not yet clear.
NPS Grant N00244-13-1-0036 (cont)
 Scope
 Not limited to acquisition process per se:  includes 
articulation of capability requirements and gaps per Joint 
Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
 Acknowledges the importance of several factors that are not 
addressed in recommendations
 Organizational roles and responsibilities
 Institutional culture
 Predilections of individual decision makers and executives
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AoA
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff. (2003, June 24). 
Operation of the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (CJCS 
3170.01). 
What Is a “Poorly Scoped” AoA?
 Two types (not mutually exclusive)
 Too narrow:  excludes one or more alternatives that should be 
considered (danger:  excludes viable portion of trade space)
 Too broad:  includes one or more alternatives that need not be 
considered (danger:  impairs effective decisionmaking) 
 How can we tell?
 “Should [not] be considered” means “might have been [or 
would never be] preferred by a ‘reasonable decisionmaker’ ”
 Identify the improperly excluded [or included] alternative(s) 
and show that the rationale (if any) is specious
 Note
 Identifying problems prospectively requires tracking upper and 
lower bounds of probable costs and benefits during AoA
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What Causes Poor Scoping?
 Inappropriate response to time constraints
 Post-WSARA push to shorten acquisition timelines*
 This can have both positive and negative effects      
 Focus on a single warfighting domain
 Nature of capability as described in ICD often makes choice 
of lead Service – and nature of solution – “obvious”
 “If the capability gap originated with the Air Force, the 
solution is going to have wings; if it originated with the Navy, 
it will have something to do with the water…”   
*Notably, current goals include reducing typical AoA duration from 16-24 months to 6-9 months.  






What Causes Poor Scoping? (cont)
 Focus on existing weapon 
systems and CONOPs
 The “[System xyz] Replacement 
AoA”:  must the new solution be 
another [xyz]-like system? 
 Variant: the “Step 1 Replacement 
System AoA” (see diagram)
 Extraneous issues
 Hot topics that “must” be 
considered
 Lack of process agility
 “4 months to get a waiver to save 
3 months of wasted effort”
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Alt A Alt B
The “Step 1 Replacement 
System AoA” will discard Alt B…
…even though it could signifi-
cantly improve overall outcomes
Applying a Systems View
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 What system(s) are we 
analyzing?
 What dimensions of system 
boundaries must we 
consider?
 What roles do the “big 3” 
DoD decision support 
systems (JCIDS, PPBES, 
DAS) play?
 How do system inputs, 
constraints, and enablers 
shape decisions about AoA
scope?
We focused on four of the seven 
Conceptagon triplets
Boardman, J., & Sauser, B. (2008). Systems Thinking: Coping 
with 21st Century Problems. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
The Two AoA Systems
(Prior to AoA Execution)
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 AoA scope is 
a property of 
a system 
output
 It is shaped 













of the Object 
System




of all the 
alternatives
Guiding Principles
1. Focus on outputs (mission outcomes); think backwards
 Problem: no way to think about capability gaps w/o thinking about 
current and programmed forces; i.e., specific weapon systems
 Remedy:  identify alternative sets of activities
for capability gaps (use tools such as DODAF)
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 “A capability is the ability to 
execute a specified course of 
action…
Capability requirements 
[should be] described in 
relation to tasks, standards, 
and conditions…. 
 [They] should be general 
enough so as not to 
prejudice decisions in favor 
of a particular capability 
solution…”
Chairman, JCS. (2012, Jan 19). 
Manual for the Operation of the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, GL-7, B-11.Wayson, M. (2010, May 11). DoDAF V2.0 Update, Presentation slides 9 and 14. 
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/DODAF/DoDAF2-0_update.ppt 
Guiding Principles (cont)
2. Start from the exterior; work inwards
 Typically, we start with an example Object System and ask “what 
else is integral & within decisionmaker’s sphere of authority?”
 Counterexample (need to improve autonomous navigation 
capabilities of an aircraft):  what’s not included:  the platform?  
the fire control system? …
3. Question constraints – what would it take to change?
 Affordability:  should the programmed force be different?   
(Genesis of current initiative to prioritize capability needs based 
on reviews of weapon system portfolios.) 
 Alternative technologies:  should decision authority be changed?
4. Iterate and reduce uncertainty 
 Necessary to identify scoping problems prospectively
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Guiding Principles - Summary
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 When it 
comes to 
proper AoA
scoping,   
systems 
thinking is 
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Thank you!  For further information…
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